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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robert Benjamin Brackett appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of eight counts of possession of sexually 
exploitative material and five counts of sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or 
seventeen years of age. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the fall of 2010, forty-six-year-old Brackett commenced a sexual 
relationship with sixteen-year-old N. B. (R., pp.131-135; Trial Tr., p.222, L.20 -
p.226, L.12.) In January 2011, N.B. disclosed the relationship to authorities. (R., 
pp.131-135; Trial Tr., p.187, L.12 - p.191, L.13; p.319, L.13 - p.320, L.13.) On 
January 14, 2011, after a subsequent investigation, Brackett was arrested on 
suspicion of sexual battery of a minor child. (R., p.134; Trial Tr., p.774, Ls.1-11.) 
Pursuant to a search warrant, officers recovered a Nikon camera from 
Brackett's home. (R., pp.135, 1020-1021; Trial Tr., p.658, Ls.7-9.) Officers did not 
immediately locate a Samsung camera that N.B. had described to them and that had 
been listed in the search warrant, but they later recovered it from Brackett's 
daughter, who had found it at Brackett's residence. (Trial Tr., p.834, L.3 - p.835, 
L.1 O; p.846, L.3 - p.848, L.2.) The Samsung camera contained an SD memory 
card. (Trial Tr., p.1021, L.2 - p.1023, L.18.) 
Ada County Sheriff's Office Detective Don Lukasik and other law enforcement 
officials recovered numerous sexually explicit photos of N.B. from the Nikon camera 
and the Samsung SD card. (R., p.77; Trial Tr., p.1275, L.12 - p.1276, L.6; p.1300, 
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L.5 - p.1305, 18, p.1309, L.16 - p.1334, L.7.) Detective Lukasik's forensic report 
indicated that the photos were taken in the time-frame of the reported sexual 
relationship between Brackett and N.B. (See Trial Tr., p.2824, L.21 - p.2825, L.6.) 
N.B. told authorities that Brackett had taken the photos of her, and that some of the 
photos depicted her having sexual contact with Brackett. (R., pp.77-78; Trial Tr., 
p.269, L.4 - p.301, L.8.) 
Shortly after his arrest, the state charged Brackett with six counts of sexual 
battery of a child sixteen or seventeen years of age, and one count of second-
degree kidnapping in Twin Falls Case No. CR-2011-00692. (See R., pp.826-827.) 
After Detective Lukasik completed his forensic examination of the cameras and SD 
card, the state additionally charged Brackett with twelve counts of possessing 
sexually exploitative material in Twin Falls Case No. CR-2011-06155. (See R., 
pp.832-833.) Ultimately, these two cases were dismissed, and the state filed a new 
complaint in Twin Falls Case No. CR-2011-08021, which included many of the 
charges from the previous two cases. (See R., pp.117-125, 830-831, 833-834.) 
After a preliminary hearing, the court bound Brackett over on seven counts of sexual 
battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age, and eight counts of 
possession of sexually exploitative material. (R., pp.163-165, 170-173, 175-190.) 
Brackett's first four appointed attorneys in Case No. CR-2011-00692 withdrew 
or were conflicted from the case for various scheduling, legal, and ethical conflicts, 
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due to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. (R., p.843; 4/28/11 Tr. 1, p.3, 
L.19; 8/2/11 , p.2, Ls.6-23; 7 /20/12 p.225, Ls.2-25. After Case 
CR-2011-08021 was filed, Brackett's fifth appointed attorney withdrew due to a 
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. (R., pp.109-113; 7 /20/12, p.225, 
Ls.19-25.) 
On March 5, 2012, the day of his scheduled jury trial in Case No. CR-2011-
08021, Brackett informed the district court that he had decided to represent himself. 
(3/5/12 Tr., p.196, Ls.19-25.) The district court granted Brackett's motions to 
represent himself and to continue the jury trial date, and assigned Brackett's sixth 
appointed attorney as stand-by counsel. (3/5/12 Tr., p.221, Ls.4-10; p.226, L.6 -
p.230, L.13.) Brackett represented himself for the remainder of the underlying 
criminal proceedings. 
The first jury trial commenced on October 29, 2012. (See generally 10/29/12 
Tr.) However, after Brackett violated several pretrial orders during his opening 
statement, the district court granted the state's motion for a mistrial. (10/29/12 Tr., 
p.24, L.6 - p.35, L.25.) The second trial was then set for January 29, 2013. (R., 
p.2278; see generally Trial Tr.) 
At the second trial, N.B. testified that she had a sexual relationship with 
Brackett between October 2010 and January 2011. (Trial Tr., p.221, L.20 - p.226, 
L.16; p.301, L.9 - p.309, L.24.) She also testified that Brackett took sexually explicit 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Brackett's motion to augment the appellate 
record with the transcript of the 4/28/11 hearing on a motion to continue from Twin 
Falls County Case No. CR 2011-00692, the 8/2/11 status hearing from Twin Falls 
County Case No. CR 2011-00692, and the 10/29/12 opening statements from 
Brackett's first trial in this case. (6/22/14 Order.) 
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photos of her in the course of this relationship. (Trial Tr., p.269, L.4 - p.302, L.25.) 
The state introduced phone records and other evidence which generally 
corroborated N.B's testimony regarding the time-frame of her relationship with 
Brackett. (See Trial Tr., p.708, L.6 - p.716, L.3; p.888, L.15 - p.908, L.6; p.2818, 
L.13 - p.2820, L.18; p.2837, L.24 - p.2839, L.9.) N.B. further testified that Brackett 
persuaded her to keep the relationship secret, and often kept his face hidden when 
they were out in public together. (Trial Tr., p.262, L.19 - p.266, L.21.) N.B. and 
Brackett utilized the code number "911" to communicate any concern that someone 
was becoming suspicious of their relationship. (Id.) During a recorded confrontation 
call between N.B. and Brackett that was arranged by authorities and admitted into 
evidence, Brackett referenced this code number. (Trial Tr., p.539, L.2 - p.545, L.25; 
State's Exhibit 53.) The officer who arranged the confrontation call interpreted 
Brackett's use of that code number as an indication that Brackett knew N.B. had 
gone to the police. (See Trial Tr., p.545, Ls.16-25.) 
The state also introduced into evidence numerous sexually explicit photos of 
N.B. that were recovered from the Nikon camera and SD card. (Trial Tr., p.276, L.1 
- p.299, L.18.) Data retrieved from the images indicated that the photos were taken 
during the time-frame of the reported relationship between Brackett and N.B. (See 
Trial Tr., p.2824, L.12 - p.2828, L.17.) While Brackett's face did not appear in the 
sexually explicit photos, N.B. testified that Brackett took the photos and appeared in 
some of them. (Trial Tr., p.276, L.1 - p.299, L.18; p.2830, L.11 - p.2833, L. 13.) 
Further, descriptive characteristics of the man appearing in some of the photos were 
consistent with characteristics of Brackett displayed in other photographic evidence 
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submitted by the state into evidence. (See Trial Tr., p.2833, Ls.2-13; p.2907, L.25 -
p.2910, L.22.) 
Detective Lukasik testified about his forensic examination of the cameras and 
SD card. (Trial Tr., p.1262, L.6 - p.1752, L.15; p.1926, L.8 - p.2172, L.4; p.2651, 
L.6 - p.2656, L.6.) Brackett testified in his own defense and denied both that he 
ever had a sexual relationship with N.B., and that he ever took sexually explicit 
photos of N.B. (Trial Tr., p.2656, L.14 - p.2771, L.13.) 
The jury found Brackett guilty of eight counts of possession of sexually 
exploitative material and five counts of sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or 
seventeen years of age. (R., pp.2645-2649.) The state had dismissed one of the 
sexual battery counts during the trial, and the jury could not reach a unanimous 
verdict on one of the other sexual battery counts. (Id.; Trial Tr., p.698, L.18 - p.699, 
L. 7.) The district court imposed a unified ten-year sentence with five years fixed on 
each count of possession of sexually exploitative material, and a unified 25-year 
sentence with eight years fixed for each count of sexual battery of a minor child 
sixteen or seventeen years of age. (R., pp.2929-2936.) The district court ordered all 
the sentences to run concurrently with each other, and with a sentence Brackett was 




Brackett states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brackett's motion to 
dismiss for violations of his right to a speedy trial? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it declared a 
mistrial over Mr. Brackett's objection? 
3. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brackett's requests 
for access to evidence? 
4. Did the money judge abuse his discretion when he precluded Mr. 
Brackett from making any further requests for expert assistance? 
5. Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. 
Brackett's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law 
violated because the accumulation of errors deprived him of his 
right to a fair trial? 
(Appellant's brief, p.13) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1 Has Brackett failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by denying his 
motions to dismiss the case on constitutional speedy trial grounds? 
2. Has Brackett failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion 
when it declared a mistrial after Brackett violated its pretrial orders in 
numerous respects during his opening statement? 
3. Has Brackett failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion 
with respect to his discovery requests? 
4. Has Brackett failed to demonstrate that the "money judge" abused his 
discretion in restricting Brackett's future requests for funding for expert 
assistance? 
5. Does Brackett's cumulative error claim fail because he has failed to show 




Brackett Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred By Denying His 
Motions To Dismiss The Case On Constitutional Speedy Trial Grounds 
A Introduction 
Brackett contends that the district court erred when it denied his various 
motions to dismiss his case for violations of his federal and state constitutional 
speedy trial rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-28.) However, a review of the 
circumstances of the case and an application of the relevant factors from Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), reveals that neither Brackett's first trial, which 
commenced approximately 21 months after he was first arrested, nor Brackett's 
second trial, which commenced approximately three months after Brackett's first trial 
ended in a mistrial, resulted in a violation of Brackett's speedy trial rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether speedy trial rights have been violated is a mixed question of fact and 
law; on appeal, an appellate court defers to the district court's factual 
determinations, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the court's application of the law to the facts found. State v. Clark, 135 
Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000); State v. McNew, 131 Idaho 268,269, 954 
P.2d 686, 687 (Ct. App. 1998). 
C. Application Of The Four-Part Barker Test Shows That There Was No Speedy 
Trial Violation 
"Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 
7 
13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to a speedy 
trial." State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 352, 160 P.3d 1284, 1287 (Ct. App. 2007). 
When analyzing claims of speedy trial violations under the state and federal 
constitutions, the Idaho appellate courts utilize the four-part balancing test set forth 
by the United States Supreme Court in Barker, 407 U.S. 514. State v. Young, 136 
Idaho 113, 117, 29 P.3d 949, 953 (2001); Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1288; 
State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 853, 153 P.3d 1195, 1199 (Ct. App. 2006). The factors 
to be considered are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the 
defendant's assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice 
occasioned by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. None of the four Barker factors is 
by itself "either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of 
the right of speedy trial." Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. 
In this case, Brackett filed numerous motions alleging that his constitutional 
speedy trial rights had been violated. (See R., pp.483-485, 1829-1831, 1843-1845.) 
The district court denied these motions.2 (R., pp.17, 768-772, 2107.) An application 
of the four Barker factors supports the district court's determinations. 
1. Length of Delay 
"The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there 
is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into 
the other factors that go into the balance." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. For purposes of 
the Sixth Amendment, "the period of delay is measured from the date there is 'a 
formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and 
2 The state stipulated to the dismissal, without prejudice, of Case No. CR-2011-
00692 on statutory speedy trial grounds. (See R., pp.484, 830-831.) 
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holding to answer a criminal charge."' Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971); Young, 136 Idaho at 117, 
29 P.3d at 953)). "Similarly, under the Idaho Constitution, the period of delay is 
measured from the date formal charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, 
whichever occurs first." Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citations 
omitted). Once the balancing test is triggered, the length of delay also becomes a 
factor in and of itself. Avila, 143 Idaho at 853, 153 P.3d at 1199. Where the state 
dismisses and refiles similar charges, and the defendant is never out of custody on 
the charges between the dismissal of the initial cases and the refiling of the new 
case on which he is ultimately tried, the speedy trial "clock" does not reset. 3 State v. 
Davis, 141 Idaho 828,837, 118 P.3d 160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Whether the delay is presumptively prejudicial, and thus triggers an 
application of the four Barker factors, depends on the circumstances, nature, and 
complexity of each case. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 332-333, 256 P.3d 735, 740-
741 (2011); Young, 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d 349. Generally, a delay is not 
presumptively prejudicial until it approaches one year. Doggett v. United States, 505 
U.S. 647, 652 n. 1 (1992). In a complex case, as opposed to a case of "ordinary 
street crime," a longer delay may be tolerated. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. See also 
State v. Spearman, 283 P.3d 272, 277 (N.M. 2012) (applying Barker and holding that 
"[a] delay of trial of one year is presumptively prejudicial in simple cases, fifteen 
3 In this case, it appears that Brackett was in custody on charges related to his 
relationship with N.B. between his January 2011 arrest and his January 2013 second 
trial. The state first filed charges in Case No. CR 2011-08021, the case in which 
Brackett was eventually tried, on July 26, 2011. (R., p.2.) The state stipulated to the 
dismissal of the charges (without prejudice) in Case No. CR 2011-00692 on 
September 2, 2011. (See R., pp.484, 830-831.) 
9 
months in intermediate cases, and eighteen months in complex cases"); Payne v. 
State, 683 So.2d 440, 452 (Ala. App. 1995) (holding that a delay of twenty-five 
months was not presumptively prejudicial where the delay could not be attributable 
to either the state or the defendant). 
As a threshold manner, this Court must determine whether to, for the 
purposes of its Barker analysis, consider the time between Brackett's arrest and 
second trial as one combined 2-year lump of time, or as two separate periods of 
time, before and after Brackett's first trial ended in a mistrial.4 The Nebraska 
Supreme Court has recognized that "other courts have specifically declined to 
consider the entire period of time beginning with the original charge or arrest in 
computing the length of delay." State v. Kula, 579 N.W.2d 541, 546-547 (Neb. 1998). 
For example, in lcgoren v. State, 653 A.2d 972, 976-978 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), 
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals rejected a defendant's contention that the 
cumulative period between a defendant's arrest, conviction, reversal, retrial, hung 
jury, mistrial, and second retrial could be combined for purposes of analyzing the 
defendant's claim that his Sixth Amendment rights had been violated. See also 
Brengettey v. State, 794 So.2d 987, 992 (Miss. 2001) (holding that because the case 
involved two trials, an analysis of Brengettcy's speedy retrial claim required the 
calculation of multiple time periods); but see State v. Manley, 220 S.W.3d 116, 122 
4 The Idaho appellate courts have not determined which of these two approaches to 
utilize in Idaho. However, in State v. Tinoco, Docket No. 39659, 2013 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 739, p.7 (Idaho App., November 7, 2013), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
recognized the split of authority on this issue and assumed, for the purposes of that 
case, that a "cumulative approach" applied. 
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(Tex. App. 2007) (rejecting the state's argument that speedy trial "clock" restarts with 
a mistrial). 
This Court should follow the approach utilized by jurisdictions which restart 
the speedy trial "clock" after a defendant is brought to a trial which results in a 
mistrial. This is especially true in this case, where, as discussed below in Section 11, 
the mistrial that resulted in a three-month delay before Brackett could be retried was 
due to Brackett's own misconduct. The state first brought Brackett to trial in October 
2012, approximately 21 months after he was originally arrested. The timeliness of 
this first trial should be the focus of this Court's analysis of Brackett's speedy trial 
challenge. 
If this Court chooses to utilize this non-cumulative approach, the state asserts 
that the 21-month delay between Brackett's arrest and the first trial is not 
presumptively prejudicial considering the unique circumstances of this case. 
Brackett was not charged with an "ordinary street crime." Instead, Brackett faced 
fifteen serious felony charges. The district court considered and ruled on over 100 
motions before the first trial. (See R., p.1608.) The criminal proceedings in this case 
ultimately culminated in a three-week trial, which included the admission of 
approximately 250 exhibits and testimony from more than two dozen witnesses. 
(See generally Trial Tr.) Further, as illustrated below in the context of issues 
Brackett raises on appeal with respect to several of the district court's pretrial 
discovery rulings, Brackett's status as an incarcerated pro se defendant created 
numerous challenges that impacted the setting of trial dates. Therefore, the state 
asserts that this is the unusual case where a delay of over one year is not 
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presumptively prejudicial and should not trigger an analysis of the Barker factors. 
However, even if the delay is presumptively prejudicial and does trigger an 
analysis of the Barker factors, the delay of either 21 months (non-cumulative 
approach), or two years (cumulative approach), was not so long, considering the 
circumstances discussed above, that it should weigh heavily in favor of Brackett's 
assertion that his constitutional speedy trial rights were violated. Instead, the state 
asserts, 21 months was not an unreasonable period of time in light of these 
circumstances. 
2. Reasons for Delay 
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should 
be weighed heavily against the state. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; Davis, 141 Idaho at 
837, 118 P.3d at 169. A more neutral reason, such as negligence or overcrowded 
courts, should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since 
the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the State rather than 
with the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118 P.3d at 
169; State v. Wavrick, 123 Idaho 83, 89, 844 P.2d 712, 718 (Ct. App.1992). A "delay 
attributable to the defendant's own acts or to tactical decisions by defense counsel 
will not bolster a defendant's speedy trial argument" and should not be weighed 
against the state. McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation 
omitted). 
Constitutional speedy trial standards recognize that pretrial delay is often both 
inevitable and wholly justifiable. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656; Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 
118 P.3d at 169. Courts "attach great weight to considerations such as the state's 
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need for time to collect witnesses, oppose pretrial motions, or locate the defendant 
in the event he or she goes into hiding." State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 900, 1 
P.3d 532, 545 (Ct. App. 201 O); see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656 ("We attach great 
weight to such considerations when balancing them against the costs of going 
forward with a trial whose probative accuracy the passage of time has begun by 
degrees to throw into question."). 
On appeal, Brackett acknowledges that "[o]verall, the reason for the delay in 
this case does not favor or disfavor Mr. Brackett's assertion that his constitutional 
right to a speedy trial had been violated." (Appellant's brief, pp.24-25.) Brackett 
further concedes that some of the delay in the case may be appropriately attributed 
to him for the purposes of a Barker analysis. (Id.) A review of the record reveals 
that, in fact, most of the delay is attributable to Brackett. 
Brackett concedes that the delay from March 5, 2012 to October 29, 2012, is 
attributable to him due to the continuances he requested and received during this 
time (including one continuance he requested and received on March 5, 2012, the 
morning of the scheduled jury trial, when the state was ready to proceed) 
(Appellant's brief, p.24 (citing R., p.745; 3/5/12 Tr., p.221, Ls.7-10; 5/9/12 Tr., p.151, 
Ls.14-18; 8/8/12 Tr., p.351, L.10 - p.360, L.3).) Brackett also concedes that "at least 
part" of the delay from January 14, 2011 to May 24, 2011, which was caused by 
multiple changes in his appointed attorneys, is attributable to him. (Appellant's brief, 
p.24.) These two time periods add up to approximately one year, or well over half of 
the approximately 21 months between Brackett's arrest and first trial; and 
approximately half of the cumulative period two-year period between his arrest and 
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second trial. 
In addition, on August 2, 1, one week before the then-scheduled August 9, 
2011 jury trial date in Case No. CR 2011-00692, Brackett's newly-appointed counsel 
told the court that he would not be ready to represent Brackett at trial the following 
week. (8/2/11 Tr., p.3, L.6 - p.10, L.1.) During the same hearing, the district court 
contacted another attorney whom Brackett had been attempting to hire, to inquire 
whether he might be available to represent Brackett the following week. (8/2/11 Tr., 
p.14, L.6 - p.17, L.24.) That attorney told the court that he could not be ready for 
trial in such a short time-frame. (Id.) Then, Brackett told the court that he wished to 
represent himself and to proceed to trial the following week. (8/2/11 Tr., p.18, L.24 -
p.19, L.9.) He also told the court he was "still in negotiations" with private counsel to 
represent him. (8/2/11 Tr., p.19, Ls.6-9.) The district court elected to vacate the trial 
date, and to take up the issue of Brackett's desire to represent himself at a 
subsequent hearing. (8/2/11 Tr., p.19, Ls.10-15.) The district court's reasonable 
decision to continue the case, rather than permit Brackett to represent himself on 
one week's notice in a complicated trial involving multiple serious felonies, was 
directly attributable to the withdrawal of Brackett's appointed attorney. Therefore, at 
least a significant portion of this delay between August 2, 2011 and March 12, 2002, 
the date on which the jury trial was first set in Case No. CR 2011-08021 after Case 
No. CR 2011-00692 was dismissed (R., p.193), should also be attributed to Brackett. 
Further, should this Court consider the time between Brackett's arrest and the 
commencement of his second trial as one cumulative two-year period for purposes 
of its Barker analysis, this Court should also attribute the period between the mistrial 
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on October 29, 2012, and the commencement of the second trial on January 29, 
2013, Brackett. As discussed below in Section II, this mistrial and subsequent 
delay was caused by Brackett's own misconduct during his opening statement at 
that trial. See United States v. Alvin, 30 F.Supp.3d 323, 342-343 (E.D. Pa. 2014) 
(noting that "most" federal appellate circuit courts have addressed the issue of how 
to assign responsibility for delays caused by mistrials by examining the reasons for 
the mistrial and then weighing the resulting delay accordingly). 
The only portion of the delay exclusively attributable to the state is the period 
between May 24, 2011, the originally scheduled jury trial date in Case No. 2011-
00692, until approximately August 2, 2011, when the district court vacated the jury 
trial scheduled for the following week when Brackett decided to represent himself. 
Relevant to this period of time, the district court granted the state's requests to 
continue the trial, on grounds which included the unavailability of a material state 
witness. (R., pp.813, 829; see generally, 4/28/11 Tr.) However, even this time 
period should be weighed only minimally against the state, since the delay was for 
the purpose of securing the attendance of a witness at trial, and because nothing in 
the record suggests that the state intentionally caused any delay to disadvantage 
Brackett's defense. 
In light of the numerous factors associated with the delay that are either 
neutral, or appropriately attributed to Brackett, as well as the relatively-short overall 
delay of approximately 21 months between Brackett's arrest and first trial, and the 
cumulative two-year period between his arrest and the second trial, the second 
Barker factor strongly supports the district court's determination that Brackett's 
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constitutional speedy trial rights were not violated. 
Assertion of Right 
The third factor in the Barker analysis is whether and how the defendant 
asserted his right to a speedy trial. In this case, as he notes on appeal (Appellant's 
brief, pp.25-26), Brackett did frequently assert his constitutional speedy trial rights 
and move for the dismissal of the charges on this ground. (See R., pp.483-485, 
1829-1831, 1843-1845). 
4. Prejudice 
The final factor in the Barker analysis is the nature and extent of any 
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; 
Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354, 160 P.3d at 1289; Davis, 141 Idaho at 840, 118 P.3d at 
172. As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests of defendants which 
the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect. Those interests are 
(1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) to minimize anxiety 
and concern of the accused, and (3) to limit the possibility that the 
defense will be impaired. 
Young, 136 Idaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 954 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). Accord 
Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354-55, 160 P.3d at 1289-90; Avila, 143 Idaho at 854, 153 P.3d 
at 1200; Davis, 141 Idaho at 840,118 P.3d at 172. "The third of these is the most 
significant because a hindrance to adequate preparation of the defense 'skews the 
fairness of the entire system."' Lopez, 144 Idaho at 355, 160 P.3d at 1290 (citing 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 583, 990 P.2d 742, 749 
(Ct. App. 1999)). 
It appears from the record that Brackett was continuously incarcerated in jail 
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for the entire 21 months prior to his first trial, and for the three additional months 
to his second trial. During that time he undoubtedly felt the anxiety and 
concern that any incarcerated individual would suffer. Despite Brackett's argument 
to the contrary, however, there is no evidence in the record to support his claim that 
his defense was actually impaired by the delay. 
The only specific prejudice to his defense Brackett alleges on appeal is that 
Chuck Robbins, his former roommate whom Brackett identified as a potential trial 
witness, died during the delay. (Appellant's brief, pp.27-28.) It appears that Brackett 
notified the court of Robbins' death by March 2012, approximately seven months 
prior to Brackett's first trial. (3/27/12 Tr., p.275, Ls.4-8.) However, other than 
Brackett's speculation on appeal, there is no indication in the record regarding what 
Robbins would have testified about, how this testimony might have supported 
Brackett's defense, or when exactly Robbins died. Further, even if Brackett's first 
trial commenced seven months earlier than it did, by March 2012, Brackett would 
still not have been able to utilize the already-deceased Robbins as a witness. Thus, 
at least the final seven months of the delay prior to the first trial could not have 
prejudiced Brackett with regard to Robbins' death. 
Finally, it appears that Brackett may have gained some benefit from the delay. 
Franklin Hall, Brackett's appointed investigator, continued to perform investigative 
services for Brackett up until the second trial. (See generally Supp. R.) Considering 
the complexity of the case, and Brackett's relatively late decision to represent 
himself, it is not likely that Brackett would have been as prepared for trial had it 
commenced earlier. 
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Because Brackett has failed to identify specific prejudice to his defense 
caused by the delay, and because the 21-month period between his arrest and first 
trial was not so significant as to have hampered his defense, the fourth Barker factor 
supports the district court's determination that Brackett's constitutional speedy trial 
rights were not violated. 
The four Barker factors, together with any other relevant circumstances, must 
be balanced and weighed to determine whether an individual's constitutional right to 
a speedy trial was violated. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. In this case, even if the length 
of the delay was sufficient to trigger a constitutional analysis under the Barker 
factors, an application of these factors, on balance, weigh against a finding of a 
constitutional speedy trial violation. Brackett has therefore failed to demonstrate that 
the district court erred in denying his motions to dismiss. 
11. 
Brackett Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
When It Declared A Mistrial After Brackett Violated Its Pretrial Orders In Numerous 
Respects During His Opening Statement 
A. Introduction 
Brackett contends that the district court abused its discretion when it declared 
a mistrial during his first trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.28-40.) Brackett also contends 
that his constitutional rights against double jeopardy were violated when the state 
retried him following this mistrial. (Id.) Brackett has failed to demonstrate either that 
the district court abused its discretion or that his double jeopardy rights were 
violated. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to declare a mistrial is within the discretion of the district court, 
and such a determination will only be reversed when that discretion has been 
abused. State v. Talmage, 104 Idaho 249,254,658 P.2d 920, 925 (1983). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Declaring A Mistrial 
During Brackett's First Trial 
Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1 (b) provides that a trial court may declare a mistrial 
upon motion of the state "when there occurs during the trial, either inside or outside 
the courtroom, misconduct by the defendant. .. resulting in substantial prejudice to 
the state's case." 
Where a trial court abuses its discretion in declaring a mistrial, a defendant's 
double jeopardy rights may be implicated. The double jeopardy clauses in the Idaho 
and federal constitutions prohibit putting one in jeopardy twice for the same crime. 
See Idaho Const. art. I, § 13; U.S. Const. amend. V. This protection applies not only 
to multiple punishments, but also to multiple prosecutions for the same crimes. State 
v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 778, 979 P.2d 648, 651 (1999); United States v. Dixon, 509 
U.S. 688, 696 (1993). 
While the double jeopardy clause protects against repeated convictions and 
prosecutions for the same crime, it does not mean that a criminal defendant is 
entitled to go free every time a trial fails to end in a final judgment. State v. Manley, 
142 Idaho 338, 344, 127 P.3d 954, 960 (2005) (citing Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 
688 (1949)). A criminal defendant may be retried if the first trial was prematurely 
terminated by the district court, without the defendant's consent, due to "manifest 
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necessity." & (citing United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824)). The Idaho 
Supreme Court, quoting an ALR annotation, has described this "manifest necess 
standard as follows: 
The basic rule is that criminal actions may be terminated by a 
mistrial without double jeopardy consequences if there is a sufficiently 
compelling reason to do so, some procedural error or other problem 
obstructing a full and fair adjudication of the case which is serious enough 
to outweigh the interest of the defendant in obtaining a final resolution of 
the charges against him-what is commonly termed a "manifest 
necessity" or "legal necessity." The courts have generally declined to lay 
out any bright-line rule as to what constitutes "manifest necessity," but 
have based their decisions on the facts of each case, looking to such 
factors as whether the problem could be adequately resolved by any less 
drastic alternative action; whether it would necessarily have led to a 
reversal on appeal if the trial had continued and the defendant had been 
convicted; whether it reflected bad faith or oppressive conduct on the part 
of the prosecution; whether or not it had been declared in the interest of 
the defendant; and whether and to what extent the defendant would be 
prejudiced by a second trial. Since the trial judge is ordinarily in the best 
position to observe the circumstances which allegedly call for a mistrial, 
his or her judgment as to the necessity for a mistrial is commonly deferred 
to; but that judgment may be set aside if the reviewing court finds that the 
judge has abused this discretionary power, particularly where it appears 
that the judge has not "scrupulously" exercised his or her discretion by 
making a full inquiry into all the pertinent circumstances and deliberately 
considering the options available .... 
State v. Stevens, 126 Idaho 822, 826, 892 P.2d 889, 893 (1995) (citations and 
emphasis omitted). 
In this case, prior to the opening statements at the first trial, the district court 
read the preliminary instructions to the jury, which included an instruction that the 
jury was not to consider the subject of penalty or punishment. (R., p.1687; 10/29/12 
Tr., p.16, L.19 - p.17, L.11.) Also, in an pretrial order granting the state's motion in 
limine, the district court ordered both parties to refrain from discussing or eliciting 
testimony regarding the following topics in front of the jury before the court had 
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further opportunity to make a relevant ruling: (1) the district court's rulings on pretrial 
motions; (2) "perceived slights or unfairness of the courts or the legal process"; (3) 
extrinsic matters as a means of impeachment, including, specifically, any witness's 
use of a fake ID; and (4) alternative perpetrators. (R., pp.1606-1616.) The district 
court found that the scope of this order was necessary in this case based on its 
findings that "Brackett has indicated during some hearings that everything is 
relevant, and that he may intend to bring the court's rulings to the jury's attention," 
and that "the record makes clear that Mr. Brackett has issues with his perceived lack 
of fairness in this case, and those statements have been made known to the court," 
and that the appropriate avenue to make such grievances was "through appeal to 
Idaho's appellate courts, to the federal courts, or to the Idaho Judicial Council," but 
not to the jury. (Id.) 
In his opening statement at the first trial, Brackett violated at least three of 
these pretrial court directives. (10/29/12 Tr., p.20, L.20 - p.26, L.6.) Brackett told 
the jury that he was facing a potential "eight life sentences." (10/29/12 Tr., p.25, 
Ls.17-21.) He also suggested that the prosecutor would coerce witnesses to lie in 
exchange for some benefit. (10/29/12 Tr., p.24, L.11 - p.25, L.15.) Finally, he 
implied that N.B. possessed a fake ID and frequented bars. (10/29/12 Tr., p.25, L.22 
- p.26, L.3.) The state then moved for a mistrial outside of the presence of the jury. 
(10/29/12 Tr., p.26, L.24 - p.27, L.7.) 
The district court gave Brackett the opportunity to respond to the state's 
motion, and to explain why he had violated the court's pretrial orders. (10/29/12 Tr., 
p.27, L.9 - p.28, L.15.) The district court then took a recess to consider the state's 
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motion and to review the applicable law. (10/29/12 Tr., p.28, L.23 - p.29, L.17.) 
Following this recess, the court presented a potential curative instruction that it had 
drafted. (10/29/12 Tr., p.29, L.18 - p.30, L.7.) However, after inviting additional 
argument from both the state and Brackett (who opposed the motion), the district 
court elected to declare a mistrial. (10/29/12 Tr., p.30, L.3 - p.35, L.25.) The court 
concluded that Brackett intended his comments to appeal to the sympathies of the 
jury, and that the curative instruction it drafted would not remedy the prejudice to the 
state caused by the comments. (Id.) 
Brackett subsequently moved to dismiss the charges against him on double 
jeopardy grounds based upon the mistrial. (R., pp.1826-1828, 1843-1845, 2016-
2018.) The district court denied these motions. (R., pp.2106-2107, 2282-2283.) A 
review of the record supports the district court's determinations. 
Brackett cannot demonstrate either that the district court abused its 
discretion, or that the court's decision to declare a mistrial was contrary to the 
applicable "manifest necessity" standard. The court did not make a hasty decision, 
but instead reviewed the applicable law, gave Brackett a full opportunity to be heard, 
and expressly considered a potential alternative to a mistrial - to the extent of 
actually drafting a potential curative instruction and presenting it the parties. Further, 
as the district court reasonably concluded, the state would have suffered significant 
prejudice had it denied the motion and resumed the trial. During his opening 
statement, Brackett referenced inadmissible evidence and made improper argument 
on various topics. The district court was concerned enough about this possibility to 
enter a specific pretrial order in an attempt to dissuade Brackett from attempting to 
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improperly influence the jury. 
On appeal, Brackett cites Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 127 P.3d 954, and Stevens, 
126 Idaho 822, 892 P.2d 889, in support of his proposition that the district court 
abused its discretion and that his double jeopardy rights were violated by the retrial. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.37-38.) However, both of these cases are easily 
distinguishable from the present case. 
In both Manley and Stevens, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district 
court erred in declaring a mistrial, and that retrial would violate the defendant's 
double jeopardy rights. Manley, 142 Idaho at 344-346, 127 P.3d at 960-962; 
Stevens, 126 Idaho at 824-830, 892 P.2d at 891-897. However, in Manley, the 
district court failed to: adequately inform itself of the grounds for the potential 
mistrial, give defense counsel an opportunity to be heard, or consider a corrective 
jury instruction as an alternative to a mistrial. Manley, 142 Idaho at 344-346, 127 
P.3d at 960-962. Further, the Idaho Supreme Court found that there was "no 
justification" for the findings made by the district court with regard to its reason for 
declaring a mistrial. kl Similarly, in Stevens, the district court did not give counsel 
an opportunity to be heard, and failed to adequately consider alternatives to mistrial. 
Stevens, 126 Idaho at 824-830, 892 P.2d at 891-897. With respect to the district 
court's decision to declare a mistrial in Stevens, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted 
with approval from the Appellant's reply brief which described the trial court judge as 
a "classic overbearing judge." kl Unlike in Manley and Stevens, the district court in 
the present case considered argument from both parties, drafted and considered a 
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potential curative instruction, and reached its decision in a methodical and 
reasonable manner. 
Brackett has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion 
In granting the state's motion for a mistrial. He has therefore also failed to 
demonstrate that his retrial following the mistrial constituted a violation of his 
constitutional double jeopardy rights. This Court should therefore affirm his 
conviction. 
111. 
Brackett Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
With Respect To His Discovery Requests 
A. Introduction 
Brackett contends that the district court erred by denying his discovery 
requests. (Appellant's brief, pp.41-61.) Specifically, Brackett contends that the 
district court erred by: (1) denying his requests to access the SD card that was found 
within a Samsung phone retrieved by police; and (2) denying his requests to transfer 
a forensic report of images recovered by police from Twin Falls County to Blaine 
County, following Brackett's transfer to the Blaine County Jail, and by denying 
Brackett's subsequent requests for access to other materials possessed by the 
state. (Id.) Brackett has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in 
either respect. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The right to grant or deny discovery lies within the sound discretion of the 
district court. State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 810, 69 P.3d 1064, 1071 (Ct. App. 
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2003). On review, the appellate court must determine whether the district court 
"acted within the boundaries of its discretion, consistent with any legal standards 
applicable to its specific choices, and whether the court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason." State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. 
App. 1994); see also State v. Wilson, 142 Idaho 431, 434-435, 128 P.3d 968, 971-
972 (Ct. App. 2006). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Denying Brackett's 
Discovery Requests 
Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(4) provides that, upon written request of the 
defendant, the prosecuting attorney shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy 
physical materials which are in the possession of the prosecuting attorney where the 
materials were obtained from or belonged to the defendant. Idaho Criminal Rule 
16(b )(5) provides that, upon request of the defendant, the prosecuting attorney shall 
permit the defendant to inspect and copy results of examinations or tests conducted 
in connection with the particular case, where the examinations and tests are known 
or are available to the prosecuting attorney. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 16(m)(1) and (2) provide that any material that 
constitutes or is alleged to constitute "sexually exploitative material" as defined in 
J.C.§ 18-1508B or I.C. § 18-1507 shall remain in the control of either the court or a 
law enforcement agency, and that the court shall deny any request by a defendant to 
copy such material, so long as the state makes the property reasonably available to 
the defendant. For the purposes of this rule, property or material shall be deemed to 
be reasonably available to the defendant if the state provides "ampl[e] opportunity 
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for inspection, viewing, and examination of the property by the defendant, defense 
counsel, and any individual the defendant may seek to qualify 
testimony at trial." !.C.R. 16(m)(3). 
1. The SD Card 
furnish expert 
On August 16, 2012, approximately two and a half months prior to his first 
trial, Brackett filed a motion to compel a "copy of all non-sensitive images, files, 
video[s], audio from devices imaged by state expert witness Don Lukasik from the 
IWRCFL to include all EXIF, JEPG information." (R., pp.1279-1280 (emphasis 
omitted).) In a subsequent order, the district court noted that, "[t]he body of 
[Brackett's] motion provides no more information on the actual request but does 
request that the information be provided to the defendant's investigator so that it can 
be taken to the jail." (R., pp.1281-1283.) The court then continued that while it 
would permit a hearing on the motion, it was "incumbent upon the defendant to 
identify specifically (1) what materials he believes have yet to provided by the state 
to him and (2) in what format he wishes to receive those materials. Only then can 
the court consider granting the defendant's motion." (Id.) 
A hearing on Brackett's motion was conducted on August 22, 2012. (See 
generally 8/22/12 Tr.) At the hearing, Brackett asserted that he had not yet been 
provided the "exact reports" that Detective Lukasik imaged from the SD card that 
was recovered from the seized Samsung camera. (8/22/12 Tr., p.459, L.25 - p.460, 
L.12.) Brackett appeared to express frustration with the multitude of formats of the 
evidence disclosed and provided by the state: 
I have now three different devices that have contained three --
there's different things on each different disk. There's something different 
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on this disk. Something different on this disk. I have a zip drive that was 
e-mailed to one of the expert witnesses for the defense, directly from 
Lukasik; and that zip drive in itself contains no images, just the image 
number and the metadata. It has way more images than should be on 
these disks and stuff that are [sic] missing; and that's in the possession of 
my investigator. And I'm just not understanding why I can't get the exact 
copy of everything that Don Lukasik did and why can't my investigator 
speak with him.5 
(8/22/12 Tr., p.458, Ls.1-16 (footnote added).) 
In response, the state discussed its disclosures relating to one of the exhibits 
specifically referenced by Brackett, "state's exhibit 30" from the preliminary hearing. 
(8/22/12 Tr., p.464, L.25 - p.470, L.5.) This exhibit was a "CD disk containing [a] 
copy of images retrieved by Mr. [Lukasik] from the Samsung digital camera." (R., 
p.159; see also 8/22/12 Tr., p.464, L.25-p.465, L.5.) 
The state explained that it previously disclosed and provided to Brackett an 
"exact copy" of this exhibit. (8/22/12 Tr., p.465, Ls.11-13.) However, while this copy 
contained all of the metadata associated with the images, it did not include all of the 
EXIF information that is embedded into the images. (8/22/12 Tr., p.465, L.6 - p.466, 
L.16.) Because Brackett had requested access to this EXIF information, the state 
5 Earlier in the hearing, Brackett told the district court that Franklin Hall, his 
investigator, told him that Detective Lukasik "refused" to take his calls. (8/22/12 Tr., 
p.455, Ls.20-22.) Later in the hearing, Hall testified, under oath, that while he 
believed Detective Lukasik "preferred" requests for information to go through the 
prosecutor's office, Detective Lukasik did not refuse to speak with him. (8/22/12 Tr., 
p.462, L.16 - p.464, L.7.) 
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separately disclosed and provided that information to Brackett.6 (8/22/12 Tr., p.465, 
L.16 - p.466, L.4.) On this disclosure of EXIF data, the state "blacked out the 
pictures" that were associated with the data. (8/22/12 p.466, L.20 - p.467, L.9.) 
However, between the various formats of disclosure, the state told the court that 
Brackett "has one way to get [the EXIF information] in one, and then another with all 
the metadata." (8/22/12 Tr., p.466, Ls.17-19.) With respect to these edits, it appears 
that the state was concerned about the I.C.R. 16(m) prohibition against copying 
sexually explicit images. (See 8/22/12 Tr., p.467, Ls.3-9.) 
The state further explained that it had made these copies and disclosed and 
provided this additional EXIF information in the hope that it would facilitate Brackett's 
trial preparation, in light of the fact that Brackett had limited access to his 
investigator and/or a computer at the jail where he was incarcerated. (8/22/12 Tr., 
p.467, L.15 - p.468, L.7.) Ultimately, the prosecutor represented to the court it was 
not aware of any discoverable information Brackett lacked with regard to his 
requests, and that Detective Lukasik had told her that "what is on the [disclosed] 
report is everything." (8/22/12 Tr., p.468, L.11 - p.470, L.5.) 
The district court then expressed a desire to hear testimony from Detective 
Lukasik, to have him "come [to court] with everything he has, duces tecum 
6 At the jury trial, Detective Lukasik explained that "EXIF" stands for "exchangeable 
image file," which refers to information about a camera that is embedded into a 
photograph, such as the type of camera, and the shutter speed. (Trial Tr., p.1350, 
L.24 - p.1351, L.6.) Detective Lukasik further testified that he utilized a program 
called lrfanView to extract EXIF information from digital photographs. (Trial Tr., 
p.1351, L.7 - p.1352, L.20.) Presumably, this EXIF information cannot be obtained 
from digital photos without a program like lrfanView. Therefore, to disclose and 
provide the EXIF information Brackett requested (which the state did), the state 
needed to provide the evidence in a separate, and different format. 
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essentially, to that hearing," so that the court could "get this out on the record 
because who am I to believe what's there." (8/22/12 Tr., p.471, Ls.6-12.) The state 
also expressed a willingness to set up a conference call with Brackett's investigator 
and Detective Lukasik to attempt to determine what disclosures Brackett felt he still 
lacked. (8/22/12 Tr., p.476, L.24 - p.478, L.1). The state also requested a copy of 
the zip drive disclosure that Detective Lukasik provided directly to Brackett's expert 
so that it could attempt to determine what, if anything, Brackett might be lacking. 
(8/22/12 Tr., p.484, L.9 - p.486, L.2.) In response, Brackett stated that he "[didn't] 
want to get [himself] into an evidentiary hearing at this moment," and that he wanted 
to save such factual development for his jury trial. (8/22/12 Tr., p.471, Ls.13-19.) 
The district court replied that "if I'm going to grant any relief to you, I have to know 
what he has and hasn't given to you." (8/22/12 Tr., p.471, Ls.20-23.) 
Rather than accept the offers of the court and the state to help facilitate the 
factual development of his discovery requests, Brackett instead elicited testimony 
from Franklin Hall, his investigator. (8/22/12 Tr., p.481, L.13 - p.484, L.2.) Hall 
testified that with regard to the disclosures provided by the state, "[t]here definitely 
appears to be some inconsistencies as far as omissions, additions, dates, 
modifications, JPEG, in upper and lower case, things of that nature." (8/22/12 Tr., 
p.483, Ls.2-5.) However, Hall did not provide specifics regarding these 
inconsistencies, and instead explained that he was "far from an expert." (8/22/12 Tr., 
p.482, L.19 - p.483, L.19.) 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied both Brackett's 
motion to compel, and the state's request to obtain a copy of the zip drive possessed 
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by Brackett: 
I'm not, as I've said already here, to make findings about what has 
or hasn't been done with the evidence. I'm left with the state telling me 
they have given everything they have. Mr. Brackett has a zip drive that 
apparently the state doesn't have. 
So I will decline the request, Ms. Sturgill, at this time and indicate 
that you should be able to get [the information on the zip drive] through 
[Detective Lukasik], the same thing that he sent to [Brackett's appointed 
expert] by e-mail, just a copy of the e-mail. 
As to your requests, Mr. Brackett, I'm going to also deny them, 
finding that at this point you have more than the state has. 
If you can come forward and say this, this, and this is what I need, 
that I don't have and identify it, I'm happy to order that; but at this point, 
I'm just in a no man's land. 
I will also authorize under Rule 15 of the Criminal Rules a 
deposition of Lukasik, if you want to do that, wherein a deposition could be 
taken duces tecum. I will certainly grant you a hearing where he would be 
required to appear in the court or by phone to also inquire in these matters 
with the court present to rule on any objections. So those options are 
available to you upon your request. 
The deposition is taken like a civil deposition. The court's not 
present. A court reporter would be. Counsel for the state would be, and 
that would essentially potentially work into creating a record on the 
discovery resolution process, so I make that aware to you [sic] and 
available to you. 
But other than that, it seems to me that I have not a sufficient 
record to say one way or another what has yet to be produced. And if Mr. 
Lukasik comes to a deposition or to court with his entire file, has it 
available to you, then perhaps we can mete out what from there is missing 
that you still need. I'm not trying to stand in your way. I just have to know 
that there are things there that need to be ordered; and at this point I have 
no way of doing that. 
(8/22/12 Tr., p.490, L.8 - p.492, L.4.) 
In response to the court's order and offer to authorize a deposition, Brackett 
stated that he did not want to conduct a deposition of Detective Lukasik. (8/22/12 
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Tr., p.493, L.23.) The district court replied that it was up to Brackett and his 
investigator to pursue his available avenues, and noted that the dilemma Brackett 
faced in attempting to facilitate his goals in discovery was based upon his own 
decision to represent himself in a case this complex. (8/22/12 Tr., p.494, Ls.9-21.) 
On appeal, Brackett contends that the district court erred when it denied his 
request to access the SD card. (Appellant's brief, pp.41-61.) Brackett has failed to 
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion. In summary, Brackett failed 
to utilize the avenues proposed by the state and by the district court to factually 
develop and support his request, or to preserve an adequate record for appeal. 
Without such support, Brackett cannot demonstrate that the district court erred. 
Additionally, a review of the record reveals that Brackett had adequate access to the 
relevant materials. 
As the district court reasonably concluded in denying Brackett's requests, 
Brackett failed to adequately support the requests with evidence or argument 
clarifying the scope of those requests. Considering the conflicting and/or unclear 
information presented to it in Brackett's 8/16/12 motion, and at the 8/22/12 hearing 
on the motion, the district court was not legally compelled to take any particular 
action in response to Brackett's requests. Instead, it was reasonable for the district 
court to require Brackett to make a more specified showing of what information he 
felt he lacked, and to provide Brackett avenues through which such a showing could 
be factually developed. 
Brackett rejected all such proposed avenues through which he could 
potentially develop his request. He did not want to depose Detective Lukasik or 
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participate in an evidentiary hearing. He did not want to provide the prosecutor a 
of evidence sent to his expert by Detective Lukasik so that the prosecutor could 
attempt to determine the nature of any discrepancies or omissions of which Brackett 
complained. In light of these circumstances, Brackett cannot demonstrate that the 
district court abused its discretion. 
Additionally, it appears from the record that Brackett did get ample access to 
either a copy of the SD drive itself and/or a functional equivalent of such a copy and 
all associated information. The district court previously ordered Detective Lukasik to 
"immediately provide a copy of any digital information he extracted and any report he 
created that the state intends to use in its case against Robert Benjamin Brackett 
and provide such copy or copies, in whichever form that may be of convenience," to 
Brackett's forensic expert. (R., p.736.) Further, the district court granted Brackett's 
motion to view the forensic report generated from the evaluation of the cameras and 
SD cards. (R., pp.1231 1233, 1236-1238.) At trial, Detective Lukasik indicated that 
the copies of the digital evidence he made for law enforcement investigators are 
exact copies of the digital media he examined that are retained in an archive. (Trial 
Tr., p.1288, L.18- p.1290, L.6; p.1299, Ls.1-18; p.1306, L.8- p.1309, L.16; p.1318, 
L.25- p.1319, L.7; p.1329, L.19- p.1331, L.20.) During the trial, in the course of a 
lengthy discussion between the court and the parties regarding Brackett's access to 
these materials, the state characterized the issue as one ultimately relating to 
Brackett's assertion that the evidence was manipulated: 
The problem is [Brackett] doesn't trust Mr. Lukasik. He doesn't trust the 
exhibits we've burned for him during the prelim and assumes that 
somehow they're different than what Detective Lukasik is using. So no 
matter how much I argue, he's not going to believe that he already has 
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501, an exact copy. He just doesn't believe it, and I don't know how to get 
around that. 
, p.1374, L.11 - p.1375, L.8.) 
Finally, Mark McLaughlin, Brackett's second appointed forensic expert, 
informed the court, in a sworn declaration, that he had arranged for the transfer of 
copies of "original items of digital evidence" possessed by the state to the Orange 
County Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory where McLaughlin could analyze 
those items. (Supp. R., p.265.) However, as McLaughlin further informed the court, 
Brackett and his investigator took actions to stop this request while it was still in 
progress. (Id.) Thus, as discussed in greater detail below in Section IV, Brackett 
restricted his own access to copies of the original evidence by interfering with 
McLaughlin's work, and by refusing to request additional funding to support 
McLaughlin's work, despite ample opportunity to do so. 
In light of the unclear nature of his requests, his refusal to attempt to factually 
develop the requests or preserve an adequate record for appeal, the amenability of 
the state and the court to facilitate his access to evidence despite the challenges 
posed by his status as an incarcerated pro se defendant, and the actual access he 
did have to the materials in question, Brackett cannot show that the district court 
abused its discretion by denying his I. C.R. 16 motions. 
In the alternative, even if the district court abused its discretion, any such 
error was harmless. "If a substantial right is not affected, an abuse of discretion may 
be deemed harmless. To establish harmless error, the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained." State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 140, 334 P.3d 806, 814 (2014) (internal 
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citations and quotations omitted); see also I.C.R. 52. In this case, it is unclear from 
the record what materials, if any, Brackett was both entitled to pursuant to !.C.R. 16, 
and lacked reasonable access to. Even assuming that there was some functional 
distinction between the material Brackett was entitled to and the material he 
ultimately had access to, it is unclear from the record how this material would have 
supported his defense, particularly in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt 
as described in the "Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings" section of this 
brief. (See also Trial Tr., p.2817, L.5 - p.2843, L.5; p.2899, L.10 - p.2910, L.22 (the 
prosecutor summarizing the state's evidence of Brackett's guilt during her closing 
and rebuttal arguments at the conclusion of the second trial).) 
2. Brackett's Requests For The Physical Transfer Of Evidence To Blaine 
County, And Other Requests For Access To Various Materials 
Possessed By The State 
On October 31, 2012, two days after the first trial in this case ended in a 
mistrial, Brackett told his investigator that he had been transferred from the Twin 
Falls County Jail to the Blaine County Jail, apparently for "safety reasons." (R., 
pp.1726, 1853-1854, 2113.) Brackett was transferred back to the Twin Falls County 
Jail sometime between December 3, 2012, and December 5, 2012. (See Supp. R., 
p.557.) Brackett then apparently remained at the Twin Falls County Jail until his 
second trial commenced on January 29, 2013. (See Supp. R., pp.575-577.) 
On November 30, 2012, approximately three to four days before he was 
transferred back to Twin Falls County Jail, Brackett filed motions requesting the 
district court to transfer sealed Exhibit 30, "Omohundro CD #23," the two seized 
cameras, and the Samsung SD card, to Blaine County so he could examine them. 
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(R., pp.1846-1847, 1853-1854.) 
On December 18, 2012, approximately two weeks after Brackett was 
transferred back to the Twin Falls County Jail, the district court entered an order 
denying Brackett's motions. (R., pp.2111-2114.) With respect to Brackett's request 
that the court physically transfer evidence to Blaine County, the district court 
concluded: 
To the extent the Defendant is requesting access to certain 
evidence kept under seal at the Twin Falls County Courthouse, the 
Defendant has had ample opportunity to view the evidence at issue and to 
prepare for trial. Further, the Defendant indicated that he was prepared to 
proceed with trial on October 29, 2012. Idaho Criminal Rule 47 provides 
that a motion "shall state the grounds upon which the motion is made and 
shall set forth the relief or order sought." The Defendant has not provided 
any statute, procedural rule, or case law that would require the court to 
permit the Defendant's continued access to the evidence at issue where 
the case was ready to proceed with trial but was only continued to a new 
date due to misconduct on the part of the Defendant. The motions set 
forth above are denied on this basis. 
(R., p.2113.) 
With respect to Brackett's request that the state be compelled to disclose 
additional discovery or facilitate additional access to evidence, the district court 
concluded: 
To the extent the Defendant is seeking to compel discovery, a 
discovery motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16 is a pretrial motion 
governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b), (d), and the Order Supplementing 
Pretrial Case Management Order of 4/20/12 entered August 9, 2012. The 
Order Supplementing Pretrial Case Management Order of 4/20/12 
provided that all pretrial motions had to be filed no later than Friday, 
September 21, 2012. The court entered an Addendum on November 15, 
2012, indicating that the deadlines set forth in the Order Supplementing 
Pretrial Case Management Order of 4/20/12 were not extended or altered 
by the resetting of the trial date to January 28, 2013. Therefore, the 
Defendant's discovery motions are untimely, and the motions are denied 
on this basis. 
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(R., pp.2113-2114.) 
In the weeks prior to his second trial, and after he was transferred back 
Twin Falls County Jail, Brackett filed additional motions to compel and to otherwise 
request access to certain material. (R., pp.2019-2022, 2196-2198, 2274-2277.) The 
district court denied these motions on the same grounds on which it denied the 
previous motion. (R., pp.2283-2285.) 
Idaho Criminal Rule 47 provides that an application to a trial court be by 
motion, and that such a motion "shall state the grounds upon which the motion is 
made." In State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 161-162, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169-1170 (Ct. 
App. 2000), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that where a defendant failed to provide 
the judge with any "legal or factual argument" as to why she was entitled to the relief 
she sought, the issue was not properly before the appellate court. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Brackett's motions on 
the ground that Brackett failed to comply with I.C.R. 47. As the district court 
concluded, Brackett provided no argument or authority supporting the proposition 
that the district court was permitted or required to physically transfer evidence to 
Blaine County, or to facilitate continuing access beyond what had already been 
provided to that point. (See R., pp.1846-1847, 1853-1854, 2019-2022, 2196-2198, 
2274-2277.) Without such authority or argument, the district court could not know 
what type of entitlement to the evidence Brackett was claiming. For example, while 
it appears as though Brackett was asserting that he lost access to some evidence 
that he previously had access to after he was transferred to the Blaine County Jail, it 
is unclear whether his access was similarly limited upon his return to the Twin Falls 
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County Jail. It was also unclear whether Brackett was able to access any of the 
materials through his investigator as he had previously, whether this access had 
been newly-restricted prior to the filings of his motions, or whether he was simply 
seeking more direct access to the materials. Because Brackett's motions did not 
comply with I.C.R. 47, and did not provide the district court with some asserted legal 
basis by which it could grant relief, Brackett cannot show that the district court 
abused its discretion by denying the motions on this ground. 
In the alternative, even if the district court erred by denying Brackett's motions 
because of his failure to comply with I.C.R. 47, Brackett has still failed to 
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion. The Idaho appellate courts 
have not analyzed to what degree !.C.R. 16 requires courts to permit and/or facilitate 
a defendant's access to sexually explicit materials possessed by the state. Federal 
courts analyzing issues governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m) (which restricts the 
reproduction and distribution of sexually explicit materials in a manner similar to 
!.C.R. 16(m)), have concluded that courts and the government are required to 
provide "reasonable" access to such evidence, and that this was a factual 
determination to be determined on a case-by-case basis. See sa. United States v. 
Knellinger, 471 F.Supp.2d 640, 645-646 (E.D. Va. 2007); United States v. Doane, 
501 F. Supp.2d 897, 901-902 (E.D. Ky. 2007). 
As the district court noted, and as discussed above with respect to the SD 
drive, Brackett "had ample opportunity to view the evidence at issue and to prepare 
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for trial."7 (R., p.2113.) By the time he filed the relevant motions, Brackett had 
already been through the discovery process culminating in his first trial, for which he 
indicated he was prepared. (See id.) Even to the extent the district court's 12/18/12 
order, entered approximately five weeks prior to Brackett's second trial, restricted 
Brackett's access to some of the materials possessed by the state, Bracket has 
failed to demonstrate that this restriction violated I. C.R. 16 or otherwise constituted 
an abuse of the district court's discretion. On appeal, while Brackett has cited 
general authority supporting the concept of a defendant's entitlement to "ongoing 
access," to discoverable materials (Appellant's brief, pp.53-61), he has identified no 
authority that either compels unlimited access to sexually explicit material possessed 
by the state, or that would otherwise compel a conclusion that the district court 
abused its discretion by restricting access in the unique circumstances of this case. 
Finally, even if the district court's 12/18/12 order constituted an abuse of 
discretion, any such error was harmless. As discussed above, a trial court's abuse 
of discretion may be deemed harmless if the state can prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Parker, 157 Idaho at 
140, 334 P.3d at 814; see also I.C.R. 52. In this case, the period of time impacted by 
the district court's order entered five weeks prior to the second trial was relatively 
insignificant in the context of the scope of the proceedings of the underlying case. In 
light of the overwhelming evidence of Brackett's guilt, there is no reasonable 
7 The district court had previously ordered that Brackett have access to a computer 
and a telephone at the jail, and noted that the "special efforts already exerted by the 
jail went above and beyond what is required" and that the jail was "limited by various 
concerns inherent in running such a facility." (Supp. R., pp.99-101.) 
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probability that the district court's 12/18/12 order, and any restrictions to evidence it 
created after that date, contributed to the icts. 
IV. 
Brackett Has Failed To Demonstrate That The "Money Judge" Abused His Discretion 
In Restricting Brackett's Future Requests For Funding For Expert Assistance 
A Introduction 
Brackett contends that the "money judge" assigned to consider his requests 
for funding to support expert and investigate assistance abused his discretion when, 
Brackett alleges, the judge precluded him from making any further requests for 
expert assistance several months before the second trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.62-
81.) A review of the money judge's denial order in question reveals that it did not 
preclude Brackett from making any further supported requests for expert assistance. 
In any event, even if the money judge did preclude Brackett from making any 
additional requests, such an order did not constitute an abuse of discretion in light of 
the ample opportunity Brackett had to make such requests prior to the denial order. 
Further, even if the money judge did err, any such error was harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A trial court's denial of a defendant's request for expert or investigative 
assistance will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that the trial court 
abused its discretion by rendering a decision which is clearly erroneous and 
unsupported by the circumstances of the case. State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 395, 
648 P.2d 203, 207 (1982). 
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C. The "Money Judge" Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Denying Brackett's 
Requests 
Indigent defendants are entitled as a matter of due process and ual 
protection to the "basic tools of an adequate defense," including the provision of 
expert assistance at public expense when such is necessary for a fair trial. Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985); Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 
(1972); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 65, 90 
P.3d 278, 290 (2003); State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 394, 648 P.2d 203, 206 (1982); 
State v. Martin, 146 Idaho 357, 361-63, 195 P.3d 716, 720-22 (Ct. App. 2008). In 
Idaho, these rights are safeguarded by Idaho Code § 19-852(a)(2), which states that 
needy defendants are entitled "to be provided with the necessary services and 
facilities of representation (including investigation and other preparation)." See Olin, 
103 Idaho at 394,648 P.2d at 206 ("Included within the scope of I.C. § 19-852(a) are 
the fourteenth amendment requirements of due process and equal protection as 
they apply to indigent defendants."). However, neither the Constitution nor I.C. § 19-
852(a) prescribes any particular procedure that must be followed when an indigent 
defendant seeks funds to assist in the preparation of his or her defense. 8 
In determining whether to provide additional assistance at public expense, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has held that such assistance is not "automatically mandatory, 
but rather depends upon [the] needs of the defendant as revealed by the facts and 
circumstances of each case." State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 838, 537 P.2d 1369, 
1374 (1975). Additionally, an indigent defendant does not have a constitutional right 
8 Subsequent to the trial in this case, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted I.C.R. 12.2, 
which sets forth procedures a court must utilize in entertaining motions requesting 
additional defense services. 
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"to choose an [expert] of his personal liking." Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. It is incumbent 
upon the trial court consider the needs of the defendant and the facts and 
circumstances of the case, and then decide whether an adequate defense is 
available to the defendant without the assistance of the requested expert or 
investigative aid. Olin, 103 Idaho at 395, 648 P.2d at 207. 
In this case, in December 2011, the district court appointed an independent 
district court judge or "money judge" to conduct ex parte reviews of Brackett's 
requests for funding to support expert and investigative assistance. (R., 9 pp.283-
287.) This order required Brackett to support such requests with: (1) a motion which 
describes the need for the funds, the requested expert's credentials, how travel and 
other expenses will be measured and billed, and a certification that the expenditure 
of public funds is appropriate to make available "necessary services and facilities of 
representation" pursuant to I.C. § 19-852(a)(2); (2) an accompanying affidavit which 
contains: a specific estimate of the amount of public funds to be expended, a 
certification that the defendant has pursued the available market for experts and that 
the requested expert provides the most economic service available in his or her field, 
and a certification that the expert will provide bills on a monthly basis. (R., pp.283-
287.) 
In April 2012, Brackett filed a motion requesting public funds to support expert 
9 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Brackett's motion to augment the record with the 
register of actions, motions, orders, and other filings from Twin Falls County Case 
No. CV-2011-05545, which was the case number assigned to the "money judge" and 
associated proceedings related to Brackett's requests for funding to support expert 
and investigative assistance. (3/27/15 Order.) The Twin Falls County Clerk 
assembled a separate supplemental record for these proceedings which the state 
refers to in this brief as "Supp. R." 
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assistance from Christopher Pavan, a computer forensic expert located in California. 
(Supp. R., pp.56-62.) A few days later, the money judge authorized Brackett to 
retain Pavan as his expert for the upcoming trial, and approved funding in the 
amount of $3,000. (Supp. R., pp.63-65.) In August 2012, Brackett, citing jail "phone 
restrictions," filed a motion requesting the appointment of Mark McLaughlin to 
replace Pavan as his forensic expert. (Supp. R., pp.135-139.) A few days later, 
despite noting that Brackett's motion did not set forth the services to be provided by 
McLaughlin, the money judge issued an order authorizing Brackett to retain 
McLaughlin, and approved additional funding in the amount of $5,000. (Supp. R., 
pp.154-156.) 
Later that month, at a hearing, Brackett told the district court that McLaughlin 
had done "absolutely nothing" on his case, and requested that the court not pay 
McLaughlin. (8/22/12 Tr., p.487, Ls.8-10.) Brackett requested that the money judge 
appoint a third forensic expert, Steven Moshlak. (Supp. R., pp.214, 222-229.) 
Before the money judge could rule on Brackett's new request, McLaughlin 
sent a letter to the court disputing Brackett's characterization of his services. (Supp. 
R., pp.230-239.) McLaughlin attached a detailed billing invoice which he had 
previously submitted to the court. (Id.) This invoice indicated that McLaughlin had 
communicated with Brackett's investigator, and had obtained and reviewed the 
defense casefile provided to him by Brackett's previously-appointed expert. (Supp. 
R., p.234.) In the accompanying letter, McLaughlin stated that he had engaged in 
numerous and extensive telephone conversations with Brackett, but that Brackett 
repeatedly requested that McLaughlin travel to Twin Falls immediately to speak with 
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him, an activity that McLaughlin did not fee! would be an efficient use of his 
resources. (Supp. R., p.231.) 
McLaughlin also reported that he had requested relevant Idaho law 
enforcement authorities to provide "original items of digital evidence for [his] 
examination," but that it was his understanding that Brackett, through his 
investigator, stopped his request to have copies of the original evidence transferred 
to the Orange County Regional Forensic Laboratory for McLaughlin's examination. 
(Supp. R., p.232.) As a result, McLaughlin stated, he had not yet had the 
opportunity to review the copies of the original digital evidence. (Id.) However, 
McLaughlin continued, he still planned (assuming adequate funding to support an 
additional 40 to 60 hours of billable time) to examine the original evidence, travel to 
Twin Falls to meet with Brackett, provide Brackett with the results of the 
examination, write a detailed report about his findings, help prepare Brackett for trial, 
and request that the court allow him to sit alongside Brackett in presenting his 
defense. (Id.) For the remainder of the proceedings in the underlying case, it 
appears that Brackett made no additional requests for funding for McLaughlin to 
complete this work. 
On September 5, 2012, the district court denied Brackett's motions to appoint 
and fund Brackett's third requested expert, Steven Moshlak. (Supp. R., pp.240-244.) 
The court noted that it was unclear what McLaughlin was or was not directed to do 
by Brackett and/or his investigator. (Id.) The court then concluded in light of the 
services already provided by McLaughlin, and McLaughlin's willingness and 
apparent ability to perform additional services, Brackett had failed to make an 
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adequate factual showing for additional funds to retain a new expert. (Id.) 
Approximately one week later, Brackett submitted an unsworn affidavit, again 
requesting that Moshlak (and David Notowitz) be funded and appointed as experts 
to assist his defense. (Supp. R., pp.245-250, 270.) The money judge denied the 
request. (Supp. R., pp.255-262.) The money judge concluded that, based upon its 
review, the services completed by McLaughlin were reasonable, there was "no 
showing that Mr. McLaughlin is unable to provide the expert assistance and services 
required by the defendant or that he is otherwise unqualified," and that "[t]he mere 
fact that the defendant may have an unsubstantiated lack of confidence in Mr. 
McLaughlin is not a legitimate basis to appoint yet another expert." (Id.) The money 
judge also noted that it would "likely approve" additional funding requests for 
McLaughlin to continue his work in this case, provided such requests complied with 
the December 13, 2011 order. (Id.) 
At approximately the same time, McLaughlin sent a sealed declaration to the 
district court requesting additional funds, and stating that he had completed some 
additional work on Brackett's case which the money judge had not yet approved 
funding for. (Supp. R., pp.263-266.) McLaughlin also informed the district court that 
Brackett no longer wanted him to work on the case. (Id.) In a subsequent order 
responding to McLaughlin's declaration, the money judge reiterated that McLaughlin 
remained the appointed expert for Brackett, but that McLaughlin was not authorized 
to perform any services on Brackett's behalf until Brackett filed a properly supported 
motion for funding for those services. (Supp. R., pp.267-269.) 
Despite the money judge's invitation to Brackett to request more funding for 
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McLaughlin, and despite the judge's indication that approval of those requests was 
"likely," Brackett continued to request that new experts be appointed. Between 
September 26, 2012 and November 8, 2012, Brackett filed at least five additional 
motions requesting that Moshlak and/or Notowitz be appointed as defense experts 
to replace McLaughlin. (R., pp.1490-1492; Supp. R., pp.270-272, 278-280, 319-322, 
338-342.) The money judge denied 10 all of these motions, noting that Brackett had 
repeatedly failed to comply with the December 13, 2011 order governing these 
requests, and had failed to support his repeated motions with new or additional 
information. (Supp. R., pp.310-313, 323-325, 368-371.) 
In the meantime, Brackett also simultaneously sought, and received, 
additional funding for Franklin E. Hall, the investigator appointed to assist his 
defense. By November 2012, the money judge had authorized total payments for 
investigative assistance in the amount of $22,523.83. (Supp. R., p.369.) Hall 
continued to perform services in excess of this authorization, and billed the Twin 
Falls County court an additional $12,123.67 by November 2, 2012. (Supp. R., 
pp.356-358.) 
Finally, on November 13, 2012, "[b]ased on the defendant's continued failure 
to comply with the Court Order entered on December 13, 2011 and the fact that the 
court has previously authorized adequate funds for an investigator to assist in his 
defense and the further fact that the defendant has chosen not utilize the digital 
expert appointed at his expense and there having been no further showing of the 
need and necessity for further services of an investigator or expert," the money 
10 The district court deferred the request filed in the criminal case to the money 
judge. (R., pp.1493-1496.) 
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judge ordered: 
1. The appoint[ment] of Franklin E. Hall and/or Franklin & 
Associates as the defendant's investigator at county expense hereby 
TERMINATED and this court will not consider any further request for the 
investigator at county expense; 
2. The appointment of a new Digital Expert is hereby DENIED 
and this court will not consider any further application for public funds for 
an expert; 
3. The further request of Franklin E. Hall for payment of 
investigative services that exceeded the authorization of this court is 
DENIED. 
(Supp. R., pp.369-370 (capitalization in original).) 
On appeal, Brackett contends that this order constituted an abuse of the 
money judge's discretion because it "preclude[ed] Mr. Brackett any access to expert 
assistance before and during the second trial." (Appellant's brief, p.62.) Brackett 
has failed to demonstrate that the money judge abused its discretion for several 
reasons. 
First, while it is clear from the context of the 11 /13/12 order that the money 
judge would not consider requests for funding for the appointment of a new forensic 
expert, this did not constitute an abuse of discretion. As the district court concluded, 
Brackett never provided an adequate factual basis as to why it was necessary to 
replace McLaughlin as an expert. (See R., 1490-1492; Supp. R., pp.222-229, 245-
250, 270-272, 278-280, 319-322, 338-342.) The money judge did not abuse its 
discretion in declining to cede to Brackett's preference that a third and/or fourth 
forensic expert be appointed where there was no adequate showing that 
McLaughlin's work was somehow deficient. 
Further, the 11 /13/12 order did not expressly preclude Brackett from 
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submitting additional requests for additional funding for his already-appointed expert, 
Mark McLaughlin. Tellingly, while the money judge specifically terminated the 
appointment of investigator Franklin E. Hall, he did not terminate the appointment of 
McLaughlin. (See Supp. R., pp.369-370.) Presumably, if the money judge intended 
to preclude all future requests for funding for expert assistance, it would have 
terminated the appointment of McLaughlin. Brackett himself clearly did not interpret 
the 11/13/12 order as precluding future requests for additional funding. After that 
order was entered, Brackett continued to file motions for additional funding for 
investigative services to be provided by Hall. (Supp. R., pp.456-459, 487-495.) The 
money judge granted at least one of these requests. 11 (Supp. R., pp.460-462.) 
Additionally, even if the 11/13/12 order did preclude Brackett from making 
additional requests for funding to support any expert assistance, this did not 
constitute an abuse of discretion. Brackett repeatedly declined the court's invitation 
to submit additional requests for funding to support the work of McLaughlin, and 
made abundantly clear that he was not going to utilize McLaughlin's services. 
Brackett continuously submitted repetitive motions requesting the appointment of a 
different expert, despite the money judge's rulings that he had failed to comply with 
the district court's previous December 2011 order governing these requests. Prior to 
the 11/13/12 order, the money judge expeditiously responded to all of Brackett's 
requests, even those that, it concluded, were deficient in form and/or substance. 
The money judge acted within its discretion to finally preclude such further motions 
11 Hall also continued to perform investigative services for Brackett well in excess of 
the money judge's authorization. In June 2012, Hall sent the court an invoice 
indicating an amount due of $28,436.69. (Supp. R., p.636.) 
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under these circumstances, as the second trial date approached. 
Finally, even if the money judge abused its discretion, any such error was 
harmless. As discussed above, a trial court's abuse of discretion may be deemed 
harmless if the state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained. Parker, 157 Idaho at 140, 334 P.3d at 814; see 
also I.C.R. 52. In this case, as previously noted, there is no indication in the record 
that Brackett would have sought additional funding for McLaughlin regardless of the 
money judge's 11 /12/13 order. Based upon his willingness to request funding for 
investigative assistance even after the 11 /12/13 order precluded him from doing so, 
it is clear that, had Bracket wished to request additional funding for McLaughlin, he 
would have filed such a request. Additionally, in light of the overwhelming evidence 
of his guilt, there is no reasonable probability that any of the restrictions placed on 
Brackett's requests for assistance by the money judge's 11/12/13 order contributed 
to Brackett's conviction at the second trial just two and a half months later. 
The money judge's order did not entirely preclude Brackett from making 
additional supported requests for expert assistance. In the alternative, even if the 
money judge's order did so prelude Brackett, this did not constitute an abuse of the 
court's discretion considering the unique circumstances of this case, in which 
Brackett repeatedly refused to avail himself of available opportunities to request 
funding for expert assistance. Further, even if the money judge abused his 




Brackett's Cumulative Error Claim Fails Because He Has Failed To Show Error, 
Much Less Multiple Errors To Cumulate 
Brackett asserts that even if the errors he alleges were individually harmless, 
his constitutional due process rights were violated by the accumulation of errors. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.82-83.) "Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of 
errors, harmless in and of themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a 
fair trial. However, a necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a 
finding of more than one error." Parker, 157 Idaho at 149, 334 P.3d at 823. (quoting 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010)). Because Brackett 
has failed to show any error, there is no error to cumulate in this case. Alternatively, 
given the weight of the evidence presented that Brackett was guilty of eight counts of 
possession of sexually exploitative material and five counts of sexual battery of a 
minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age, any errors, even in "aggregate do not 
show the absence of a fair trial." & at 149, 334 P.3d at 823. Brackett has therefore 
failed to show any basis for a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of 
conviction entered upon the jury verdicts finding Brackett guilty of eight counts of 
possession of sexually exploitative material and five counts of sexual battery of a 
minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age. 
DATED this 9th day of September, 2015. 
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